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Using Bayesian methods, we estimate a Markov-switching New Keynesian 
(MSNK) model that allows shifts in the monetary policy reaction coefficients and 
shock volatilities. Using U.S. data, we find that a more-aggressive monetary policy 
regime was in place after the Volcker disinflation and before 1970 than during the 
Great Inflation of the 1970s. Our estimates also indicate that a low-volatility regime 
has been in place during most of the sample period after 1984. We connect the timing 
of the different regimes to a measure of inflation persistence. In the MSNK model, the 
population moment describing the serial correlation of inflation is a weighted average 
of the autocorrelation parameters of the exogenous shocks. A shift to an aggressive 
monetary regime or a low-volatility regime shuffles the weight from the more-
persistent to the less-persistent shocks, resulting in a decline in inflation persistence. 
The timing of regimes from the estimated MSNK model generates a statistically 
significant 'low-high-low' pattern of inflation persistence that is consistent with 
reduced-form empirical models. We discuss relative importance of policy shifts and 
volatility shifts in explaining this pattern. 
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An important issue for monetary policy is understanding the factors that contribute
to persistence in deviations of in
ation from its underlying trend. Persistence and
predictability are closely related, so given the importance attached to in
ation fore-
casting in central banks, it is important for them to understand the factors driving
in
ation persistence.1 Evidence of changes to in
ation persistence from empirical
models that allow for time-varying coecients, such as Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2009), often reports a `low-high-low' pattern. This pattern re
ects low persistence
prior to the Great In
ation of the 1970s, followed by a rise in the 1970s and then a
decline beginning in the early 1980s. Recent eorts to interpret changes in in
ation
persistence through the lens of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els, such as Benati and Surico (2007), Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2008) and
Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009), focus on the role of monetary policy and the
decline in persistence that occurs roughly after the Volcker disin
ation.2 To allow for
a potential monetary policy regime change, these papers split the sample of U.S. data
around the early 1980s.3 A central conclusion of this work is that monetary policy
can reduce in
ation persistence by more aggressively adjusting the nominal interest
rate in response to in
ation.
In this paper, we estimate a New Keynesian model that admits various forms
of policy shifts, such as a time-varying in
ation target and regime-dependent policy
coecients. We also incorporate regime-dependent heteroskedastic shocks, which is
an additional mechanism that aects in
ation persistence and, as Sims and Zha (2006)
discuss, avoids the statistical bias that results in favoring shifts in policy coecients
due to the failure of accounting for heteroskedasticity. One benet of estimating
MSNK models is that we can let the data speak when exactly regime changes happen,
rather than judgementally splitting the sample. Using Bayesian methods, we estimate
a few variations of the Markov-switching New Keynesian (MSNK) model and nd that
a more aggressive monetary policy regime was in place after the Volcker disin
ation
than during the 1970s. Our estimation results indicate that monetary policy was
also more aggressive in the period prior to 1970, which is consistent with that period
also having lower in
ation persistence. We also nd that a low-volatility regime is
1Our notion of in
ation persistence does not necessarily imply constant trend in
ation. If the un-
derlying trend is time-varying, our notion of in
ation persistence is equal to in
ation-gap persistence
as in Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
2The statistical signicance of this decline has been debated. While Cecchetti and Debelle (2006),
Clark (2006), Levin and Piger (2006), and Pivetta and Reis (2007) question the statistical signi-
cance of the decline in in
ation persistence, Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009) provide evidence
for changes in in
ation-gap persistence using both univariate and multivariate models. Stock and
Watson (2007) conclude in
ation persistence has fallen from roughly 1984 on because a smaller
fraction of the variance of changes in in
ation is attributable to persistent shocks.
3While Benati and Surico (2007) use only data starting from 1983, Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2009) estimate a similar DSGE model with two subsamples.
2primarily in place throughout most of the post-1984 period, or Great Moderation
era.4
To understand how shifts in monetary and volatility regimes aect in
ation persis-
tence, we analytically show the mechanisms that explain how a shift in these regimes
aect the serial correlation in in
ation. Specically, we show that the population
moment describing its serial correlation is a weighted average of the autocorrelation
parameters of the exogenous shocks, which include a technology, monetary policy
and markup shock. The weight on the autocorrelation parameter for each shock is
a function of the monetary policy coecient and shock volatilities, both of which
depend on the current regime. Changes in regimes then reshue weights over the
autocorrelation parameters and alter the serial correlation properties of in
ation. A
shift to a monetary regime that more aggressively ghts in
ation or a shift to a low-
volatility regime reduces the weight on the more persistent shock, which reduces the
serial correlation in in
ation.
To empirically quantify these channels, the broadest model we estimate is a four-
regime model that allows independent regime changes between two monetary regimes
and two shock-volatility regimes. We also estimate more basic two-regime models
with switching only in monetary policy or shock volatility, but nd that the four-
regime model is favored by data. Estimation of these two-regime models reveals
that it is dicult to explain the increase in in
ation persistence during the Great
In
ation period of 1970s without appealing to a less aggressive monetary policy.
More generally, we nd a shift in monetary regime has a larger impact on persistence
than a shift in the shock-volatility regime, though shifts in the volatility regime still
have a quantitatively meaningful impact on persistence.
We also nd that modeling a time-varying in
ation target improves model t
when regime-switching is allowed only in volatility or policy coecients, but that it
makes little dierence in the four-regime model. This nding indicates that jointly
modeling shifts in policy coecients and volatility captures low-frequency movements
in in
ation, so leaves little role for also allowing time-variation in the in
ation target.
The conclusion that it is dicult to explain the shift in in
ation persistence with-
out appealing to monetary policy supports the previous ndings in Cogley, Primiceri,
and Sargent (2009) and Benati and Surico (2007), who both emphasize policy fac-
tors in accounting for changes in in
ation persistence.5 We also nd that the active
monetary policy following the Volcker disin
ation, combined with the low volatility
of the Great Moderation, set in place conditions conducive to low in
ation persis-
tence. However, many of these conditions were also in place prior to the 1970s, so the
4In a related work, Kang, Kim, and Morley (2009) estimate a multiple breakpoint model for
in
ation and provide condence intervals for these breakpoints. However, the model is reduced-
form, so cannot address whether the breaks are driven by policy or other factors.
5See also Murray, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2009)
3mechanisms in the MSNK model can replicate the `low-high-low' pattern of in
ation
persistence that reduced-form models report, such as in Evans and Wachtel (1993)
and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2009).
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe
a MSNK model. Section 3 provides a brief description of data and econometric
methodology. Section 4 reports parameter estimates and the estimated timing of
regime shifts. In Section 5, we discuss implications of estimation results for in
ation
persistence. Section 6 concludes. Technical issues on solving and estimating the
model are discussed in the appendix.
2 A Markov-Switching New Keynesian Model
This section presents a Markov-switching New Keynesian model with a relatively
standard private sector specication, following closely the setups in Ireland (2004) and
An and Schorfheide (2007). The primary dierence relative to these specications is
that the parameters in the monetary rule and shock volatilities are subject to regime
shifts.
The basic elements of the model economy include a representative household, a
representative rm that produces a nal good and a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms that each produce an intermediate good indexed by j 2 [0;1].
2.1 Households
The representative household chooses fCt;Nt;Btg
1












where Ct denotes consumption of a composite good, Ht are hours worked, At is a
measure of technology,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor and  > 0 is the coecient of
relative risk aversion.6 Utility maximization is subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint
PtCt + QtBt = Bt 1 + WtHt + PtDt   PtTt;
6 As we discuss below, technology follows a non-stationary process and induces a stochastic trend
in consumption. Detrending Ct by At is convenient because the model has a well-dened steady
state in terms of detrended variables. Also, an alternative interpretation of At is as a measure of
external habit stock.
4where Bt are nominal bond holdings, Dt are real prots from ownership of rms, Tt
are lump-sum taxes, Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt is the nominal wage and Qt
is the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate.
2.2 Firms
Intermediate goods-producing rm j produces output, yjt, according to
yjt = Atnjt;
where At is an exogenous measure of productivity that is the same across rms and
njt is the labor input hired by rm j. The labor market is perfectly competitive and
rms are able to hire as much as demanded at the real wage.











where '  0 determines the magnitude of the price adjustment cost,  denotes the
steady-state in
ation which coincides with the central bank's in
ation target7 and
pjt denotes the nominal price set by rm j 2 [0;1]. The price adjustment cost is in
terms of the nal good Yt. Each intermediate goods-producing rms maximizes the


















is the representative household's stochastic discount factor and djt are nominal prots















where  t denotes real marginal cost, where  t = (Wt=Pt)=At.
There is a representative nal-goods producing rm that purchases the interme-
diate inputs at nominal prices pjt and combines them into a nal good using the
7When the central bank's in
ation target follows a random walk, it creates a stochastic trend of
in
ation ?
t. Accordingly, we replace  by ?











where t > 1 8 t is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Variations in t
translate into shocks to the desired markup, which is the actual markup in the absence





and  is the steady-state elasticity of substitution.
The prot-maximization problem for the nal-goods producing rm yields a de-







where pjt is the nominal price of good j. The zero-prot condition for the nal







is the aggregate price level.
2.3 Policy











where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, t = Pt=Pt 1,  is the target rate of
in
ation, r is the steady-state real rate, y is the steady-state level of the detrended




p11 1   p11
1   p22 p22

; (8)
where pii = Pr[st = ijst 1 = i]. The active, or more aggressive, regime corresponds to
st = 1 and the less-active regime, or possibly passive regime, corresponds to st = 2.
This labeling implies (2) < (1).
The assumption of a constant in
ation target may seem at odds with the empirical
literature that stresses the importance of allowing for mean shifts when measuring
in
ation persistence, such as Cecchetti and Debelle (2006), Clark (2006) and Levin
6and Piger (2006). For example, we could have followed Schorfheide (2005) and Liu,
Waggoner, and Zha (2009) and estimate a DSGE model with a policy rule that has
a shifting in
ation target. However, our rationale for imposing a constant mean,
but shifting reaction coecients, is to give monetary policy a potential mechanism
to aect in
ation persistence.8 A shifting in
ation target in the policy rule of this
DSGE model does not aect the model implied serial correlation of in
ation, so is an
inadequate framework to address the issue of how changes in monetary policy aect
in
ation persistence.
The potential exists, however, that allowing for changes in trend in
ation may
better capture changes in U.S. in
ation dynamics than allowing for shifts in the
reaction coecients in the policy rule or shock volatilities. To capture this possibility,
we also estimate versions of the MSNK model that allows trend in
ation to following





t 1 + "t; (9)
where "t  N (0;2
).
Regarding scal policy, we assume the scal authority passively adjusts lump-sum
taxes to satisfy the government's 
ow budget constraint and transversality condition
on government debt.
2.4 Exogenous Shock Processes
Aggregate productivity follows
lnAt =  + lnAt 1 + lnat; (10)
where
lnat = a lnat 1 + "at; (11)
with "at  N(0;2
a (rt)) and jaj < 1 for rt 2 f1;2g. The process for productivity
imposes that it grows at an average rate of , but is subject to serially correlated
shocks that have varying degrees of volatility depending on the regime.
Shocks to the markup and monetary policy rule follow
lnut = (1   u)lnu + u lnut 1 + "ut; (12)
lnet = e lnet 1 + "et; (13)
where "ut  N(0;2
u (rt)), "et  N(0;2
e (rt)); juj < 1 and jej < 1 for rt 2 f1;2g.
8A subsequent section demonstrates how changes in reaction coecients aect persistence.




q11 1   q11
1   q22 q22

; (14)
where qii = Pr[rt = ijrt 1 = i].
In the four-regime MSNK model, the shock-volatility regime, rt, is independent
from the monetary regime, st.9 As a result, the shock-volatility regime can change
without requiring a change in the monetary regime. This approach allows the data to
indicate whether, say, a period of high in
ation volatility is more likely to be caused
by a less aggressive monetary policy or higher exogenous shock volatility. In principle,
the volatility for each shock could change regime according to their own independent
Markov chains. However, it turns out that such a model does not necessarily improve
the model t and create identication issues of each regime. So we focus on the model
with synchronized switching in volatilities.
2.5 Equilibrium Relations
In a symmetric equilibrium, each intermediate goods-producing rm faces the same
marginal cost, so makes the same pricing and production decisions. In equilibrium, we
can then eliminate the j subscripts, yielding yjt = Yt, pjt = Pt, njt = Nt, acjt = ACt
and djt = Dt. The log-linearized rst-order conditions for private agents are
b yt = Etb yt+1   
 1

b Rt   Etb t+1   Etb at+1

; (15)
b t = Etb t+1 + (b yt + b ut); (16)
where b yt  ln(yt=y) is a measure of the output gap, yt = (Yt=At); b t = ln(t=)
and b Rt = ln(Rt=R), where R = r. Conditioning on a given regime, the monetary
rule and shock processes are linear, given by
b Rt = (st)b t + 
 (st) b yt + et; (17)
b at = ab at 1 + "at; (18)
b ut = ub ut 1 + "ut; (19)
b et = eb et 1 + "et; (20)
where b at = lnat, b ut = ln(ut=u), and b et = lnet. Equations (15)   (20) represent the
full MSNK model.
We compute the minimum state variable solution of the model by the method of
undetermined coecients.10 The resulting solution takes the following form:
9The transition matrix in this case is P1
N
P2.
10In the model with a nonstationary in
ation target, we would replace the steady-state in
ation
by the stochastic trend to compute b t and b Rt.
8b yt = By(st)xt ; b t = B(st)xt ; b Rt = BR(st)xt ;xt = [b at;b ut;b et]
0: (21)
Using methods in Davig and Leeper (2007), we check if the parameterization of
the model yields a unique equilibrium. Also, since we use a rst-order approximation
to the equilibrium conditions of households and rms, the solution coecients depend
only on the monetary regime and not the shock-volatility regime. The steady state
is also independent of regime-shifts, since only the slope coecients in the monetary
reaction function change and not any variables that aect the deterministic steady
state.11
One issue that naturally arises when solving the model is determinacy of equilib-
rium - that is, whether the solution is unique within the class of bounded solutions.
An indeterminate equilibrium will have a dierent representation and depend on a
dierent set of state variables than a determinate one. One approach to account
for this complications in the estimation is to follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
where posterior weights apply to the determinate and indeterminate regions of the
parameter space. This is a project worth pursuing in the context of a MSNK model,
but beyond the scope of this paper. Our approach to dealing with the issue of inde-
terminacy is to require a linear representation of the MSNK model to have a unique
solution. The linear representation maps (15) (20) into a purely linear system of ex-
pectational dierence equations, where the standard methods of solving these systems
are available (e.g. eigenvector-eigenvalue decompositions).12 This approach permits
an active and passive monetary regime, but places limits on `how passive' and `how
long' the passive regime can remain in place. In the subsequent empirical analysis,
we consider only the region of parameter space where the determinacy restrictions of
the linear representation are satised.
3 Data and Econometric Methodology
The linear structure of the model solution conditional on the current regime makes the
application of the approximate Kalman lter of Kim and Nelson (1999) feasible. Given
laws of motion for the shock processes and the minimum state variable solutions of
in
ation, output, and nominal interest rate, we can write down the following regime-
11For an example of how to linearize a model where regime shifts do aect the steady state, see
Schorfheide (2005)
12Technical appendix provides a brief description of the linear representation used in Davig and
Leeper (2007) and some issues related with using the linear representation for checking the deter-
minacy restrictions.
9dependent state-space representation13
Zt = Az + Bz(st)xt + [1;0;0]
0 lnAt ; Zt = [lnYt;t;Rt]
0; (22)
xt = xt 1 + "t ; xt = [b at;b ut;b et]
0 ; "t = ["at;"ut;"et]
0; (23)
lnAt =  + lnAt 1 + b at: (24)
xt is a vector of state variables and Zt is a vector of three observed variables consist-
ing of per capita real GDP, in
ation (log dierence of GDP de
ator), and 3 month
Treasury bill rate. Bz(st) is a conformable state-dependent matrix with elements
arising from the solution of the MSNK model. The sample period is from 1953:Q1
to 2006:Q4. A plot of U.S. in
ation, as measure by the GDP de
ator, is given in
Figure 1. Constructing the likelihood for the MSNK model requires integrating out
latent variables, including the history of regimes. Kim and Nelson (1999) note that
collapsing some paths of regimes with very small probability is necessary to make
the ltering algorithm operable. Otherwise, we have to consider  St dierent paths
of regimes to evaluate the likelihood value at t, where  S is the number of possible
regimes. We allow 4 (16) dierent paths of regimes in a two (four) regime case. The









where # is the vector of structural parameters and Zt 1 denotes observations up to
time t   1.14 For the models with two regimes, either rt or st is constant and the
corresponding probability density collapses to unity.
Using the Bayesian approach, we combine the likelihood with a prior distribution
of #. From the Bayesian perspective, the resulting posterior distribution of # re
ects
an update to the prior distribution using the information from the likelihood and is
a key tool for inference. Incorporating prior information on # provides additional
curvature for the posterior density and excludes implausible estimates of parameters
which may overt the sample data.15 The posterior distribution of # is hard to
characterize analytically, so we use a random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to
obtain the posterior draws.16 We initialize the Markov chain at the (local) mode of
13The representation assumes the model with the constant in
ation target of the central bank. We
can accommodate a random walk with drift in the in
ation target in the same way as incorporating
a technological trend.
14We increased the number of histories that are considered and found little dierence in terms of
the likelihood value.
15For further discussion of advantages of Bayesian approach in the estimation of DSGE models,
see An and Schorfheide (2007).
16We use a mixture of normal distribution and t distribution as a proposal density. The relatively
fat-tailed t distribution makes it more likely for the ratio between the proposal density and the target
density to be bounded, which is a pre-requisite for uniform ergodicity necessary for the convergence
of Markov chains. For this reason, Geweke (2005) mentions that transition mixtures can be powerful
tools in building posterior simulators that are robust to ill-behaved posterior distributions.
10the posterior density by using a numerical optimization routine (CSMINWEL provided
by Christopher Sims). The inverse of the negative hessian evaluated at the local mode
is used as the covariance matrix of the proposal density. After obtaining one million
draws from the Markov chain, we compute means and the covariance matrix and
update the covariance matrix of the proposal density. Then, we run multiple Markov
chains starting around the means of the previous one million draws with the updated
covariance matrix. We run those chains until trace plots of parameters and other
convergence diagnostic tests conrm that the distribution of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) output converges to the stationary distribution.17
In constructing the likelihood, we use the ltered probability for each regime to
integrate out the latent regimes. Since regimes are not directly observable to the
econometrician, we are often interested in computing the estimates of the probability
of dierent regimes conditional on all the observations available. This approach pro-
vides an indication of which history of regimes is most probable given the available
observations. The smoothed probability of each regime can be obtained by applying








where Qt is a composite four-state discrete valued random variable that describes
both the monetary and volatility regimes.18 Either rt or st replaces Qt in (26) for the
two-regime models. Since p(QTjZT;#) and p(QtjZt;#) are obtained as byproducts of
the likelihood evaluation, this is relatively easy to implement.
To identify the sources of the changes in in
ation persistence, we need to compare
dierent regime-switching models. The marginal likelihood of each model provides a
coherent framework to compare non-nested models. Conceptually, it is obtained by






The practical computation of this constant is done by the numerical approximation
based on the posterior simulator as in Geweke (1999), for example.19
17For details, see technical appendix.
18The transition matrix is P1
N
P2 with elements given by p(Qt+1jQt):
19Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) argue that Geweke (1999)'s method is not robust when the
posterior distribution may be non-Gaussian due to regime-switching eects and suggest an alter-
native method of computing the marginal likelihood based on a family of elliptical distributions.
However, this turns out to be numerically unstable in the models we estimate because the measure
is quite sensitive to the scaling parameter of the covariance matrix of the proposal density. We
provide additional details of this issue in the technical appendix.
114 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Prior Distribution
Table 1 provides information on the prior distribution of the parameters. If possible,
the prior means are calibrated to match the sample moments of observed variables.
For example, the prior mean of the average technology growth rate () is set to
match the average growth rate of per capita real GDP. Similarly, the prior mean of
the steady-state in
ation rate () in the model is set to match the average in
ation
rate in the data. And the prior mean of the discount factor () is then set to match
the average nominal interest rate conditional on the prior means of  and . The
autocorrelation of technology growth (a) and the standard deviation of the tech-
nology shock (a) are set to match the autocorrelation and the standard deviation
of per capita real GDP. Prior distributions of other parameters are mostly set to be
consistent with the existing literature on the estimation of New Keynesian models.
For example, the prior distribution of the slope of the Phillips curve is from Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004). For switching parameters, prior distributions are set to be
roughly consistent with split sample (pre-1983, post-1983) estimates in xed-regime
models. This induces the natural ordering of regime-dependent parameters and avoids
the potential risk of the `label switching' problem as noted in Hamilton, Waggoner,
and Zha (2007).
4.2 Posterior Distribution
We estimate three versions of the MSNK model. The rst allows switching only in the
monetary policy rule and the second allows switching only in the shock volatilities.
The third model is the four-regime MSNK model that allows independent switching in
monetary policy and the shock-volatility regimes. Table 2 provides prior and posterior
probability intervals for all the parameters for the models with a constant in
ation
target.
For the MSNK model with switching only in the monetary policy rule, the mone-
tary regimes adjust the nominal interest rate dierently in response to in
ation. The
mean of the reaction coecient to in
ation in the active regime is 2.07, which is sig-
nicantly larger than the .99 coecient in the less-active regime.20 The response to
output is similar across regimes, although the uncertainty associated with the coe-
20We classify the later regime as `less active,' even though the point estimate for the coecient
is less than unity and the 90% credible interval extends down to .86. The reason we do not call
it passive is that the mean response to in
ation, along with the mean response to the output gap,
would not yield indeterminacy in a xed-regime model. There are parameter values, however, in the
90% credible interval that would yield indeterminacy in a xed-regime model.
12cient in the more-active regime is much higher. The timing of the dierent regimes
are given by the posterior expected values of the smoothed probabilities in Figure 2,
which shows two persistent changes in the monetary regime over the sample period.
The rst occurs when the monetary regime changes from the more-active to less-
active stance in late 1970. The second shift occurs in mid-1982 when policy moves
back to the more-active stance and remains there until the end of the sample.
The timing and nature of monetary regimes is roughly consistent with estimates
from Clarida, Gal , and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), where both
nd substantial dierences in the reaction of the nominal interest rate to in
ation
before and after approximately 1980. A key dierence between the estimates from
the MSNK model and these papers is that policy was active for a signicant period
before 1970. Similarly, estimates from Bianchi (2008) and Eo (2008), who allow
regime shifts in policy coecients, also nd that the active policy stance was in place
for much of the time prior to the 1970s.
A key feature of U.S. data is the high and volatile in
ation in the 1970s (see Figure
1). In models with a constant steady-state level of in
ation, our estimation matches
this shift in in
ation volatility using whatever switching parameters it has available,
which in this rst case are the monetary reaction coecients. The reaction coecient
to in
ation plays an important role in determining the volatility of in
ation. As
this coecient increases, the volatility of in
ation declines. In the limit, monetary
policy can completely stabilize in
ation. Moving in the other direction, in
ation
becomes more volatile as the reaction to in
ation declines. Davig and Leeper (2007)
show that a monetary reaction coecient less than unity actually has the aect of
amplifying shocks. Thus, the MSNK model with switching in only the monetary rule
uses a passive monetary regime to generate higher in
ation volatility in the 1970s.
Alternatively, the volatile in
ation in the 1970s could re
ect higher shock volatility, so
estimating the MSNK model with switching only in monetary policy could incorrectly
be attributing the higher volatility in the 1970s to policy. Indeed, Sims and Zha (2006)
argue that there is little evidence for changes in the systemic behavior of monetary
policy once heteroskedasticity of shocks are properly considered.
To address this concern and assess the role of shifting shock volatilities in explain-
ing U.S. data, we estimate the MSNK model with switching only in the variance of
the shocks. Table 2 reports that the standard deviation of each shock roughly doubles
in the high-volatility state and that the relative volatility of the markup shock, which
is the most persistent one among three shocks, more than triples. Figure 3 reports
the timing of the low volatility regime. Again, the high in
ation periods in the 1970s
and volatile early 1980s stand out as a dierent regime.
Estimation of two MSNK models suggests that the high and volatile in
ation dur-
ing the 1970s can be explained by either a passive policy or a high volatility regime. To
evaluate the relative contribution of each channel, we estimate a broader MSNK model
13with switching in both the monetary policy and shock-volatility regimes. Switching
in the monetary policy and volatility regimes is independent, so for example, a change
in the monetary regime does not require a change in the shock-volatility regime.
For this four-regime MSNK model, the regime-switching parameters are broadly
similar to the previous estimates. Table 2 shows the lower bound in the posterior
interval of the monetary policy reaction coecient in the less aggressive monetary
regime is greater than unity, implying active policy in both regimes. Also, the dier-
ence in the estimates of policy response to in
ation across regimes is smaller than the
two regime case, indicating that volatility shifts soak up some of the role of shifts in
the policy rule. The upper panel in Figure 4 shows the posterior expected values of
the smoothed probabilities for the active monetary policy regime and high-volatility
regime. These estimates indicate that monetary policy was aggressive in responding
to in
ation throughout the latter half of the 1950s and most of the 1960s. Beginning
in the late 1960s, however, policy began responding less aggressively and maintained
this stance until the early 1980s. Policy reverts to its less-active stance preceding the
1990-91 recession and throughout the relatively sluggish recovery in the early 1990s.
Policy then turns again to a more-active stance in the mid-1990s, showing indications
again of switching to the less active regime around the time of the 2001 recession.
The period of less-active policy following the 2001 recession also corresponds to the
period following the technology bubble collapse and subsequent period of relatively
low in
ation.
The posterior expected values of the smoothed probabilities for the shock-volatility
regimes from the four-regime model are given in the lower panel in Figure 4. The high
volatility regime corresponds to the 1970s and early 1980s, with also a brief interlude
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The low-volatility regime is in place throughout
most of post-1984 period, or Great Moderation era, with the brief exception of the
2001 recession. Also, estimates characterize the Volcker disin
ation period with the
high-volatility regime, rather than the more aggressive monetary regime. Policy is
active in both regimes, so policy still responded systematically more than one-for-one
to in
ation during the Volcker disin
ation. However, the dramatic shift in policy
during this time is re
ected initially more as a volatile policy shock before being
recognized as a shift in the systematic behavior of policy.
As an initial check of the t of the four-regime MSNK model, Figure 1 shows
a reasonably accurate in-sample t for the in
ation series. More formally, Table
3 reports the log marginal likelihood values for each model and indicates that the
data prefers the model with switching shock volatility over the model with switching
monetary policy. However, the model that best ts the data is the four-regime MSNK
model. Since the marginal likelihood penalizes overparameterization, the better t
of the four-regime model is not driven by the increase in the number of parameters.
We also consider the t of MSNK models with the random-walk in
ation target of
the central bank. While including random-walk drift in in
ation target improves t
14for models with switching only in policy coecients or volatilities, there is little gain
in the four-regime model. The random-walk in
ation target is introduced mainly as
a tool to capture low-frequency variations in monetary policy. Our nding suggests
that once shifts in policy coecients and shock volatilities are allowed, these low-
frequency variations in monetary policy are properly captured, leaving little room for
shifts in the central bank's in
ation target.
5 Changes in In
ation Persistence
5.1 Measure of In
ation Persistence
This section demonstrates how changes in the monetary and volatility regimes aect a
measure of in
ation persistence. Specically, we compute the population moment for
the autocorrelation of the in
ation. For the four-regime MSNK model, this statistic
conditional on a given regime is








































for i;j = 1;2.21 Equation (28) shows the serial correlation of in
ation is a weighted
average of the autocorrelation parameters of the exogenous shocks. A change in the
monetary or shock-volatility regime reshues the weights across these autocorrelation
parameters. A regime change that shifts weight from more persistent to less persistent
shocks will decrease this measure of in
ation persistence. Using the posterior mean
estimates from the four-regime MSNK model, Figure 5 shows how the weights on the
mark-up shock and policy shock vary with changes in the monetary policy reaction
to in
ation. The gure shows how a shift to the more aggressive monetary regime
21This construction of the model-implied in
ation persistence has similarities to Carlstrom, Fuerst,
and Paustian (2008). They suggest a more aggressive monetary policy and a decline in the relative
volatility of more persistent shocks are possible explanations for the decline in in
ation persistence.
However, they do not emphasize the mechanism that a more aggressive monetary policy essentially
increases the relative importance of less persistent shocks in the persistence measure.
15transfers weight to the less persistent shocks and thereby, reduces in
ation persistence.
In contrast, if we allow regime shifts in the central bank's in
ation target, but not in
policy coecients or shock volatility, these weights in the above measure of in
ation
persistence do not vary across regimes.
5.2 Empirical Evidence for Shifts in In
ation Persistence
Before assessing implications of the estimated MSNK models for in
ation persistence,
we rst want to establish an empirical benchmark that describes changes in persis-
tence. For the benchmark, we estimate the following simple Markov-switching time
series model using Bayesian methods
t = (St) + 
(St)t 1 + "t; (32)
where "t  N(0;(St)2) and St evolves according to a Markov chain.22 Figure 6
plots the persistence of the in
ation based on this model, which is given by regime
probability-weighted values of 
(St). Most notably, there is a clear, statistically
signicant rise in the persistence measure beginning in the late 1960s and extending
through to the mid-1980s. The `low-high-low' pattern matches the pattern coming
from more sophisticated time-series models, such as Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent
(2009), although they focus on the decline after the early 1980s. Our focus on the
`low-high-low' pattern is to see whether a similar pattern emerges from the MSNK
model. Given the results in the previous section, the timing of monetary regimes from
the MSNK model and changes in persistence from the empirical Markov-switching
model do roughly coincide. The similar timing suggests a link between in
ation
persistence and shifts in monetary policy. The next step, however, is to establish
if the full four-regime MSNK model, which is the model preferred by the data, can
generate shifts in in
ation persistence that are similar in magnitude and timing to
the empirical benchmark.
5.3 Structural Interpretation
Table 4 and Figure 7 report the model-implied in
ation persistence statistic for
each MSNK model across regimes. The regimes with the more-active policy (i.e.
st = 1) or lower volatility (i.e. rt = 2) have lower persistence than the regimes with
less-active policy (i.e. st = 2) or higher volatility (i.e. rt = 1). Focusing on the
four-regime MSNK model (i.e. specication P3 in Table 4), the lowest degree of
in
ation persistence is in the regime with aggressive monetary policy and low shock
22Evans and Wachtel (1993) use a similar reduced-from Markov-switching model for in
ation,
except they impose a unit root in one regime. They show a shift occurs to the regime with the unit
root around 1968 that lasts until 1984.
16volatility (i.e. st = 1 and rt = 2). Comparing this regime with the one having less
aggressive monetary policy and higher volatility (i.e. st = 2 and rt = 1) reveals
signicant dierences. For example, the 90% credible interval for persistence in the
more-active monetary policy regime with low volatility is [.74,.82]. In the less-active
monetary policy regime with high-volatility regime, the interval is [.84,.91]. Compared
to models with only policy shifts or volatility shifts, the four-regime model generates
somewhat tighter posterior intervals for the model-implied in
ation persistence. For
example, in the model with only policy shifts, the 90% credible interval for persistence
is [.73,.85] in the more-active monetary policy regime, which is wider than [.74,.82]
in the more-active monetary policy regime with low volatility from the four-regime
model.
A more complete picture of the changes in model implied in
ation persistence is
given in Figure 7, which plots the measure of persistence from the model given in
(28). The more-active policy combined with some periods in the low-volatility regime
generates relatively low persistence early in the sample. Persistence increases begin-
ning with the shift to less-active policy in the late 1960s and then peaks around 1980
due to the shift to the high-volatility regime. The switch to the more-active mone-
tary policy, and then to the low-volatility regime, decreases persistence throughout
the early 1980s. The upward movements that occur around 1990 and 2000 correspond
to monetary policy shifts back to the less-active regime, which occur roughly around
the NBER recessions in 1990-91 and 2001.
The pattern of rising persistence during the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a decline
starting around the Volcker disin
ation, is consistent with the empirical benchmark
and existing evidence on changes in in
ation persistence, as in Cogley, Primiceri, and
Sargent (2009). The results from the DSGE analysis in Cogley et. al. primarily
attributes the decline in in
ation persistence to a decline in the variability of the
in
ation target. In our framework, the variability of the serially correlated monetary
shock has a similar interpretation, which we also estimate to have fallen by over 50
percent. One dierence, however, from the results in Cogley et. al. is that we nd
monetary policy to be more aggressive in ghting in
ation in the 1960s than in the
1970s, which has the added eect of further lowering in
ation persistence. Cogley
et. al. restrict the monetary policy response to in
ation to be the same throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, so do not attempt to identify the source of the relatively low
persistence in the 1960s relative to the 1970s. As a consequence, Cogley et. al. nd
little dierence between the monetary reaction coecients in the 1960-1979 sample
and the 1980-2006 sample. Our results suggest that combining the 1960s and 1970s
into one sample essentially mixes two regimes. The implication is that the policy
coecients estimated from the 1960-1979 sample will be closer to estimates based on
a post-1980 sample. In contrast, the dierence between policy coecients becomes
larger if estimates from a post-1980 sample is compared to a sample that just uses
17the 1970s.23
Overall, the four-regime MSNK model captures the qualitative shifts in persistence
quite well, but does not fully capture the magnitude. In particular, the decline in
persistence is smaller in the MSNK model compared to the empirical benchmark.
However, the the MSNK model does capture the run-up in in
ation persistence during
the 1970s and its' peak level.
How can we evaluate the relative importance of policy shifts vs. volatility shifts
in explaining the rise and fall of in
ation persistence? We plot the model implied
persistence from the model with only volatility shifts in Figure 8. While the qual-
itative pattern is similar to the four-regime case, the magnitude of rise in in
ation
persistence is smaller. As an implication, the model without monetary regime change
has diculty reproducing the swings in persistence implied by the empirical bench-
mark. To further illustrate the impact monetary policy has on persistence, relative to
shifts in volatility, Figure 9 plots the model-implied measure of in
ation persistence
conditioning on both the low- and high-volatility regimes. For example, the right-
most vertical dashed line corresponds to the reaction to in
ation in the more-active
monetary regime. A shift in the volatility regime causes a rise in in
ation equal to
the vertical distance between the red-dashed curve and solid black curve. In contrast,
a shift in policy causes a movement along a curve. Conditioning on the low-volatility
regime (i.e. the red-dashed curve), a shift in monetary policy from the more- to less-
active regime would cause persistence to rise along the red-dashed curve. The result
of the monetary regime change is a rise in persistence that is roughly double the rise
caused by a shift in the volatility regime. The general conclusion is that shift in the
monetary rule, conditional on the posterior means of the structural parameters, plays
a greater role than shifts in volatility. However, the impacts on persistence of shifts in
volatility are non-trivial and volatility shifts nstill contribute, though more modestly,
to movements in in
ation persistence.
6 Conclusion
This paper reports the results of Bayesian estimation of MSNK models with regime
switching in monetary policy and shock volatility. Overall, U.S. data favors the model
with independent switching in both the monetary policy and shock-volatility regimes.
We show that the population moment describing the serial correlation of the in
ation
is a weighted average of the autocorrelation parameters of the exogenous shocks,
where the weights depend on the dierent monetary and shock-volatility regimes.
23Of course, estimating a single-regime model just using the 1970s period is likely to yield in-
determinacy. However, the linear system representing the regime-switching MSNK model enlarges
the determinate parameter space, so permits brief excursions into passive monetary policy without
inducing indeterminacy.
18Consequently, changes in either of the regimes reshue the weights over these serial
correlation parameters and alter the serial correlation properties of in
ation. A shift
to the more-active monetary regime reduces the weight on the more persistent shocks,
so lowers the serial correlation of in
ation. Similarly, a shift to the low-volatility
regime reduces the weight on the more persistent shocks and also contributes to
reducing in
ation persistence. Estimates indicate that in
ation persistence began
rising in the late 1960s and peaked around the Volcker disin
ation. This `low-high-
low' pattern of in
ation persistence also emerges from a reduced-form econometric
model and is consistent with empirical evidences documented in Cogley, Primiceri,
and Sargent (2009). Our general conclusion is that shifts in monetary policy play a
larger role in aecting in




The MSNK model is inherently nonlinear, which complicates the conditions for de-
terminacy. Following Davig and Leeper (2007), we obtain the linear representation of
the MSNK model and restrict our attention to the uniqueness of bounded solutions
in the linear representation. For the illustrative purpose, rst assume all shocks are
i.i.d. and there are only two regimes. Then we can rewrite expectations as follows:
Ett+1 = E[t+1
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where it = t(st = i;"t); yit = yt(st = i;"t), and "t =
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b at b ut b et
0 for i = 1;2.24
The information set, 
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fstg. Distributing probability mass across the dierent conditional expectations for
in
ation, as in (33)   (34), is the same approach as in Gordon and St-Amour (2000)
and Bansal and Zhou (2002).
Next, dene the forecast errors

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for j = 1;2. Substituting expectations, (33)   (34), and the policy rule, (17); into
(15)   (16) yields the stacked system


































and A; B and C are conforming matrices consisting of private sector parameters,
policy parameters and the transition matrix. The stacked system has constant coe-
cient matrices, yet captures the impact potential regime changes in monetary policy
24Whether shocks are i.i.d. or serially correlated does not matter for determinacy, so is made here
for convenience.
20have on expectation formation. Further, standard methods for solving linear rational
expectations systems are applicable to (37), such as Blanchard and Kahn (1980).25
Necessary and sucient conditions for determinacy, which is the existence of a
unique bounded solution to (37), is that all the generalized eigenvalues of (B;A) lie
inside the unit circle. The determinacy conditions are intuitive. First, the passive
monetary regime cannot be too passive, meaning the response to in
ation can be less
than one, but still has to be above some minimum threshold. And second, the passive
regime cannot be too persistent, meaning that the expected duration of the regime
must be below a given threshold. The determinacy conditions are joint restrictions
over both monetary regimes, so the parameters governing the active regime aect the
determinacy restrictions over the passive regime. Therefore, the more persistent or
active the active regime is, the more persistent or passive the passive regime can be.
One caveat using the linear representation to check the determinacy conditions
is that there might be non-MSV solutions of the MSNK model even if determinacy
restrictions are satised in the linear representation.26 However, there are no known
(necessary and sucient) determinacy conditions for the class of bounded solutions
of MSNK models. Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009b) and Cho (2009) suggest
to consider mean-square stable solutions rather than bounded solutions and provide
determinacy conditions within the class of mean-square stable solutions of a quasi-
linear version of MSNK models.27 While these advances are certainly interesting,
restricting our attention to the class of bounded solutions is of interest not only
because of the uniqueness of equilibrium, but also because we can justify the log-linear
approximation of the original fully nonlinear model only in the local neighborhood of
the steady state by the implicit function theorem.28 For this reason, we believe that
the linear representation is useful for the analysis of MSNK models given our current
knowledge.
7.2 Convergence Diagnostics of MCMC Output
We start a MCMC chain initialized at the (local) posterior mode found by a numerical
optimization routine. We compute the mean (m) and the covariance (c) matrix based
25McCallum (2004) proves the equivalence between MSV solutions and determinate (i.e. unique
and non-explosive) solutions from solving a system of linear expectations dierence equations for
purely forward looking models. Davig and Leeper (2007) show the equivalence between the MSV
solution and determinate solution of the stacked system in regime-switching rational expectation
models.
26See Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009a).
27The terminology is from Davig and Leeper (2009). The quasi-linear version is based on the log-
linear approximation of the original MSNK model but keep nonlinearities due to regime-switching
parts unlike the linear representation.
28See Woodford (2003) for this point.
21on 1 million draws from the MCMC chain. Then we run multiple MCMC chains
initialized at widely dispersed points around the mean (m) by using the covariance
matrix (c) as the scaling matrix in the proposal density of the Chain. We burn-in the
rst 100,000 draws and use the remaining 1,400,000 draws for the posterior inference
in the four-regime model.29 We compute potential scale reduction factors (PSRFs) as
suggested by Brooks and Gelman (1998) to assess the convergence of MCMC output.
PSRFs below 1.1 or 1.2 are regarded as an evidence for the convergence of MCMC
output. Using three chains starting from overly dispersed points, I obtain values
below 1.1 for all the parameters in the four-regime model and the model with only
policy shifts. In the model with only volatility shifts, the PSRF for the persistence
of markup shock is 1.27 but all the other parameters have PSRFs below 1.1. Other
convergence diagnostics such as tests of the equality of split-sample means or visual
check on trace plots also indicate that MCMC output stabilize.
7.3 Marginal Likelihood
Marginal likelihood can be computed by the Monte Carlo integration of a probability

















where #i is a posterior draw. Geweke (1999) proposes an implementation with h()
a Gaussian density around the posterior mean. Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) show
that the Gaussian approximation for the proposal density to compute the marginal
likelihood can be misleading and numerically unstable due to the non-Gaussian pos-
terior distribution of parameters in models with regime-switching. They suggest the














where f(r) is any one-dimensional density dened on the positive reals which we can
estimated based on posterior draws. 
 is the sample covariance matrix computed by
centering out posterior draws from the posterior mode. And c is a scaling parameter.
Then the weighting function can be constructed as a truncated g() where the area




g(#) ; L = f# : p(Z
Tj#)p(#) > Lg
29We burn-in the rst 100,000 draws and use the remaining 1,900,000 draws in the model with
only volatility shifts while we burn-in 500,000 draws use the remaining 500,000 draws in the model
with only policy shifts.
22where L is an indicator function which is 1 if # belong to L and 0 otherwise. While
Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) provide an example where this methods is more
robust than Geweke (1999), it does not work well for our purpose. Particularly, g()
turns out to be very sensitive to the choice of a scaling parameter of 
.30 In contrast,
Geweke (1999)'s method provides more reliable estimates of marginal likelihood in
our cases. And the marginal likelihood computed by Sims, Waggoner, Zha (2008)'s
method also indicates the the best tting model is the four regime model with a
constant in
ation target as implied by the marginal likelihood computed by Geweke
(1999)'s method.
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25Table 1: Prior Distribution
Parameters Domain Density Para(1) Para(2) Regime Spec
 R+ Gamma 1.5 .25 P2
1 R+ Gamma 2 .25 P1, P3
2 R+ Gamma 1 .1 P1, P3

 R+ Gamma .08 .05 P2

1 R+ Gamma .1 .05 P1, P3

2 R+ Gamma .1 .05 P1, P3
 R+ Gamma .5 .2 P1, P2, P3
 [0,1) Beta .998 .001 P1, P2, P3
 R+ Gamma 1.5 .4 P1, P2, P3
 R+ Gamma .005 .001 P1, P2, P3
 R+ Gamma .0086 .001 P1, P2, P3
a [0,1) Beta .3 .2 P1, P2, P3
u [0,1) Beta .7 .2 P1, P2, P2
e [0,1) Beta .5 .2 P1, P2, P3
a R+ Inverse Gamma .004 4 P1
a;1 R+ Inverse Gamma .006 4 P2, P3
a;2 R+ Inverse Gamma .003 4 P2, P3
u R+ Inverse Gamma .003 4 P1
u;1 R+ Inverse Gamma .004 4 P2, P3
u;2 R+ Inverse Gamma .002 4 P2, P3
e R+ Inverse Gamma .003 4 P1
e;1 R+ Inverse Gamma .004 4 P2, P3
e;2 R+ Inverse Gamma .002 4 P2, P3
lnA0 R Normal 9.546 .1
y R Normal -0.067 .01 P1, P2, P3
p11 [0,1) Beta .9 .05 P1, P2, P3
p22 [0,1) Beta .9 .05 P1, P2, P3
q11 [0,1) Beta .9 .05 P3
q22 [0,1) Beta .9 .05 P3
Notes: Para (1) and Para (2) list the means and the standard deviations for Beta, Gamma,
and Normal distributions; s and  for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(j;s) /
  1e s2=22, a and b for the Uniform distribution from a to b. P1 allows switching
only in monetary policy coecients while P2 allows switching coecients only in variance
parameters of shocks. P3 allows switching for both policy coecients and variances.
26Table 2: Posterior Distribution
Parameters Prior 90% Interval Posterior 90% Interval
P1 P2 P3
 [1.10,1.91] [1.41,1.68]
1 [1.59,2.41] [1.76,2.37] [1.56,2.05]




1 [0.025,0.174] [0.056,0.283] [0.022,0.160]

2 [0.024,0.174] [0.017,0.123] [0.021,0.137]
 [0.181,0.804] [0.291,0.661] [0.258,0.552] [0.281,0.617]
 [0.9965,0.9995] [0.9984,0.9997] [0.9984,0.9998] [0.9986,0.9997]
 [0.851,2.134] [2.952,4.596] [3.653,4.836] [3.364, 4.848]
 [0.0033,0.0066] [0.0036,0.0051] [0.0040,0.0058] [0.0042,0.0058]
 [0.0070,0.0103] [0.0061,0.0078] [0.0070,0.0090] [0.0063,0.0081]
a [0.001,0.592] [0.000,0.076] [0.000,0.143] [0.000,0.097]
u [0.407,0.999] [0.929,0.967] [0.923,0.941] [0.932,0.967]
i [0.172,0.828] [0.610,0.712] [0.662,0.756] [0.635,0.739]
a [0.0022,0.0080] [0.0095,0.0112]
a;1 [0.0031,0.0112] [0.0131,0.0178] [0.0124,0.0181]
a;2 [0.0016,0.0060] [0.0065,0.0087] [0.0060,0.0080]
u [0.0027,0.0099] [0.0016,0.0026]
u;1 [0.0022,0.0079] [0.0034,0.0052] [0.0024,0.0041]
u;2 [0.0011,0.0039] [0.0011,0.0016] [0.0009,0.0014]
e [0.0016,0.0059] [0.0042,0.0055]
e;1 [0.0022,0.0079] [0.0055,0.0076] [0.0051,0.0072]
e;2 [0.0010,0.0039] [0.0029,0.0037] [0.0027,0.0038]
lnA0 [9.381,9.719] [9.517,9.548] [9.524,9.529] [9.513,9.546]
y [-0.0832,-0.0504] [-0.0847,-0.0535] [-0.0654,-0.0589] [-0.0836,-0.0511]
p11 [0.82,0.98] [0.95,0.99] [0.95,0.99]
p22 [0.82,0.98] [0.88,0.95] [0.92,0.98]
q11 [0.82,0.98] [0.84.96] [0.85,0.96]
q22 [0.82,0.98] [0.91,0.98] [0.91,0.97]
Notes: P1 allows switching only in monetary policy coecients while P2 allows switching
coecients only in variance parameters of shocks. P3 allows switching for both policy
coecients and variances.
27Table 3: Log Marginal Data Densities
P1 P2 P3 In
ation Target
2,699.2 2,719.5 2,727.8 Constant
2,706.9 2,724.6 2,723.2 Random Walk
Table 4: MSNK Model-Implied Inflation Persistence
Model Description P1 P2 P3
(jst = 1;rt = 1;8t) [ High  / High ] [.73,.85] [.81,.87] [.77,.86]
(jst = 1;rt = 2;8t) [ High  / Low ] - [.76,.82] [.74,.82]
(jst = 2;rt = 1;8t) [ Low  / High ] [.83,.92] - [.84,.91]
(jst = 2;rt = 2;8t) [ Low  / Low ] - - [.79,.87]
Notes: The posterior 90% probability interval of the implied autocorrelation of in
ation
is reported in [ ]. st = 1 corresponds to the more-active monetary policy and rt = 1
corresponds to the high-volatility regime.
28Figure 1: Actual vs. Predicted Inflation from four-Regime MSNK
Model (GDP deflator)














































29Figure 2: Posterior Expected Values of the Smoothed Probability for
the Active Monetary Policy Regime (2-Regime Model)





























































Figure 3: Posterior Expected Values of the Smoothed Probability for
the Low-Volatility Regime (2-Regime Model)























































30Figure 4: Posterior Expected Values of the Smoothed Probabilities
(four-regime model)











































































































Figure 5: Weights on Persistence Parameters in Inflation Autocorre-
lation Function


























































































31Figure 6: Inflation Persistence Based on Markov-switching Time Series
Model (90% Bands)





















































Figure 7: MSNK Model-Implied Inflation Persistence (90% Bands, 4-
Regime Model)
























































32Figure 8: MSNK Model-Implied Inflation Persistence (90% Bands, 2-
Volatility Regime Model)



























































Figure 9: MSNK Model-Implied Inflation Persistence (Parameters are
set to posterior means, except 1 which varies)
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